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2019-nCoV in context: lessons learned?
The emergence of a new coronavirus (2019-nCoV) in 
Wuhan creates a sense of déjà vu with the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) epidemic 
in China in 2003. Coronaviruses are enveloped, positive-
stranded RNA viruses of mammals and birds. These 
viruses have high mutation and gene recombination 
rates, making them ideal for pathogen evolution.1 
In humans, coronavirus is usually associated with 
mild disease, the common cold. Previous emerging 
novel coronaviruses, such as SARS-CoV and Middle 
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), 
which emerged in the Middle East in 2012, were 
associated with severe and sometimes fatal disease. 
MERS-CoV was less pathogenic than SARS-CoV, with 
the most severe infections mainly in individuals with 
underlying illnesses. Clinically and epidemiologically, 
the contemporary 2019-nCoV in China seems to 
resemble SARS-CoV. The genome of 2019-nCoV also 
appears most closely related to SARS-CoV and related 
bat coronaviruses.2 The infection has now spread widely, 
with phylogenetic analysis of the emerging viruses 
suggesting an initial single-locus zoonotic spillover 
event in November, 2019,3 and subsequent human-
to-human transmission. The SARS epidemic in 2003 
was followed soon after by avian influenza H5N1 in 
2006, centred on the Asian continent and Middle East. 
Other surprising viral zoonoses that have caused serious 
disease include Nipah encephalitic virus in pigs and 
humans in southeast and south Asia in 1999–2014, 
and large-scale Ebola virus epidemics in 2014–16 and 
2018–19 in west and central Africa. Taken together, 
these events ring alarm bells about disease emergence 
in the 21st century, and the importance of human 
diseases originating from indiscriminate contacts with 
infected animals.
There is an increasing focus on the human-animal-
environment disease interface, as encompassed in the 
One Health concept. Mortalities, disability-adjusted 
life-years, and billions of dollars of economic losses 
from these infections demand action and investment 
in prevention to face novel challenges to human and 
animal health. Research has led to better understanding 
of the nature and drivers of cross-species viral jumps, 
but the detail is still elusive. No reservoir population of 
bats for SARS and MERS-CoV or Ebola virus have been 
definitively identified, despite considerable searching, 
possibly because of the source virus circulating in small 
and isolated populations. Forensic examination has 
clarified the human infection sources and multispecies 
involvement in these diseases, with some species 
confirmed as competent hosts (eg, camels for MERS-
CoV4), bridge (or amplifying) hosts (eg, pigs for Nipah 
virus, non-human primates for Ebola virus5), or dead-
end hosts. The crucial checkpoint is the jump and 
bridging of the viruses to humans, which occurs most 
frequently through animal-based food systems. In the 
case of SARS, markets with live and dead animals of 
wild and domestic origins were the crucible for virus 
evolution and emergence in the human population. 
Once the viruses’ functional proteins enabled cell entry 
in civets (Paguma larvata) and racoon dogs (Nyctereutes 
procyonoides), the bridge was established and it was only 
a matter of time before the jump to humans occurred.6 
Sequence comparison of civet viruses suggested 
evolution was ongoing; this was further supported by 
high seroprevalence of antibodies against SARS-CoV 
among civet sellers, suggesting previous cross-species 
transmission events without necessarily human-to-
human transmission.7,8 Similarly, early Ebola virus was 
mostly associated with bushmeat and its consumption 
in Africa; Nipah virus is associated with date palm sap, 
fruit, and domestic pig farms; MERS is associated with 
the camel livestock industry; and H5N1 arose from viral 
evolution in domestic and wild birds, to ultimately bring 
all these cases to humans. The 2019-nCoV is another 
virus in the pipeline that originated from contact with 
animals, in this case a seafood and animal market in 
Wuhan, China.
Inevitably, the health sectors are primarily reactive to 
these events, acting to save lives as well as undertake 
surveillance and control. The drama and panic typically 
fade into history with the substantial costs being 
absorbed by ordinary people, international financial 
systems, and tax bases, making life go on as normal, 
but not quite. The frequency, severity, and financial 
impacts of these events are growing, and the world can 
no longer afford to just wait and see, especially because 
prevention of these threats is in theory relatively simple 
and where addressed has resulted in a cessation of risk. 
The best example being Nipah virus, where separation 
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of pig farms from fruit agriculture, and by the same 
measure, fruit bats, has substantially reduced the 
potential for Nipah virus spill over. Bats have always 
had viral populations, and despite close association 
with humans for millennia, this has not resulted in 
pandemics until recent times.
In conclusion, have we learned lessons? Yes and no. 
These events are of global public health and economic 
importance and need collective societal response. But 
governments and civil society are not heeding these 
warnings, as the 2019-nCoV attests.9 Concerns have 
been repeatedly raised and voiced since the idea of One 
Health was first expressed in around 2000.10 What we 
need to learn and communicate is that the zoonotic or 
agricultural bridging of novel pathogens from domestic 
and captive wildlife needs urgent attention, along 
with attention to the human appetite for meat. This 
approach is easily achieved for coronavirus threats—
eg, by substantially reducing the trade of risky species 
of wild caught animals for food or other purposes, and 
a culturally sensitive ban on the sale of these animals 
in wet markets. Vaccines and therapeutic alternatives 
might be possible and are needed, but they are a 
response, because the emerging strain is unpredictable 
and a vaccine is unlikely to prevent the initial events. 
In some parts of Africa, prevention of Ebola virus and 
future coronavirus threats require shifts in food habits, 
a transition from bushmeat being a cultural norm 
or primary source of protein, and by discouraging 
agricultural development that brings bats into increased 
contact with humans or livestock. In the Middle East, 
re-evaluating and improving infection prevention and 
control measures for camel farms, a recent introduction 
coincident with the emergence of MERS-CoV, would be 
a positive step forward.
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